U.S. Ties With Seoul Strained

January 1, 2003
U.S. Ties With Seoul Strained by Troop Presence and North Korea
By STEVEN R. WEISMAN

WASHINGTON, Jan. 1 - For half a century the United States has had no more
stalwart ally in Asia than South Korea, where 37,000 American troops are
stationed to protect against an invasion from the north, and as a symbol of
the unity of purpose between the two countries.

Now South Korea has become one of the Bush administration's biggest foreign
policy problems. Years of resentments on a variety of issues are boiling over
in the form of anti-American demonstrations in Seoul and pronouncements by the
outgoing and incoming presidents challenging American policies on dealing with
North Korea's nuclear ambitions.

For the fifth time in three months, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell is
dispatching his top Korea specialist to Seoul for urgent consultations on how
to forge a unified policy to handle North Korea's accelerated steps to restart
its nuclear weapons program.

The envoy, James A. Kelly, the assistant secretary of state for East Asia and
Pacific affairs, is expected to pave the way for a visit this year by the
newly elected president of South Korea, Roh Moo Hyun, who says he intends to
follow the policy of President Kim Dae Jung of engaging North Korea in
negotiations and continuing economic contacts.

Mr. Kelly said recently that Mr. Roh's past statements did not portend a
rupture with the United States, and that the United States would wait until
after he and his team takes office and then "look at them face to face and
find out what it is that we agree on and what it is that we disagree with."

But many experts on Korea expect the differences to be significant. Unlike
South Korea, the United States favors a policy of no bargaining and no new
economic incentives until the North abandons its nuclear program. At the same
time, and at the behest of its anxious friends in the region, President Bush
and Secretary Powell have repeatedly tried to lower the temperature and pledge
to seek a diplomatic solution to the problem.

"In some ways, the problem in South Korea has become harder to handle than
that of North Korea," said a Korea specialist with ties to many members of Mr.
Bush's foreign policy team. "Our first priority is to get Roh and Kim to stop
saying that the United States approach will not work. If we don't do that, the
divide will get worse."

Some Bush administration officials insist that talk of divisions between South
Korea and the United States are "way off base," as one official said this
week.

"We and the South Koreans are knitted up," he asserted. "We all agree that
there has to be a peaceful solution to the problem of North Korea."

This official added that the administration's policy is one of diplomatic but
not economic or military pressure on North Korea, and that this was also in
keeping with the views of Japan, China and Russia.

But other administration officials acknowledge that there are strains not only
with American partners in the region, but within the administration itself, on
how to handle North Korea. Indeed, some officials expect South Korea to try to
lobby Japan, China and Russia to persuade Washington to let them press for
diplomatic openings with North Korea, even if America maintains its policy of
not having any contacts.

The administration's internal strains, apparent since the first months of Mr.
Bush's term of office, have subsided over the current situation, officials
say, in part because there is a unanimity of views that the United States
cannot give into what officials say is "blackmail" by the regime of President
Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang.

But the strains have taken a toll on the relationship between Washington and
Seoul, diplomats and administration officials say. Early in 2001, for example,
Secretary of State Powell announced that the United States would continue the
Clinton administration policy of engaging with North Korea and building on a
1994 "framework agreement" with North Korea.

Under that arrangement, the North froze work at its plutonium-producing
nuclear plant at Yongbyan in return for certain economic benefits, including
fuel oil shipments and assistance in the construction of two light-water
nuclear reactors that would supply the North's energy needs without the danger
of being converted to weapons production facilities.

But as they came into office, many members of the new administration were
privately disdainful of the 1994 accord and critical of President Kim and his
"sunshine policy" of opening contacts with the North. The White House and Mr.
Powell then announced that instead of continuing the policy, the
administration would review it.

The shift was interpreted in Seoul as a rebuff to President Kim and to Mr.
Powell.

Later in 2001, the administration shifted again, this time saying that it
would indeed continue the policy of engagement. President Kim was cheered, but
some diplomatic experts say the wounds between him and the United States
remained.

Earlier this year, American intelligence revealed that although North Korea
had kept its Yongbyon plant frozen, it was undertaking a separate clandestine
nuclear program using highly enriched uranium. A new difference of emphasis
emerged with the discovery.

Although South Korea labeled North Korea's plans unacceptable, President Kim
opposed cutting off all economic contacts. The United States nonetheless
persuaded Mr. Kim, and also the Japanese, to immediately halt oil shipments to
North Korea as part of the 1994 framework.

South Korea went along, but privately South Korean officials warned that such
an act might provoke North Korea into restarting its Yongbyon plant. Their
warnings have now come true.

American officials say there was little choice but to halt the oil shipments.
"Can you imagine Congress approving any funding for oil for North Korea at
this point?" one asked.

Others point to Mr. Bush's well-publicized antipathy for North Korea as the
main reason for the United States's hard line. But to South Koreans, these
steps have aggravated a series of other factors in producing divisions between
the United States and its Asian allies.

In recent weeks, South Koreans' attentions have focused on the presence of
37,000 American troops on their soil as a major new irritant. The South
Koreans' feelings were aggravated by an incident last June, when two
14-year-old girls were run over by an American armored vehicle north of Seoul.

The episode unleashed an outpouring of resentment that some experts say dates
from the years when a series of military dictators in South Korea, acting with
what was perceived as support from Washington, thwarted all efforts at
democratization. South Korea did not emerge as a democracy until the 1990's.

Administration officials say they are handicapped by their lack of knowledge
of Mr. Roh, Korea's new leader. He is a lawyer and human rights activist whose
victory was boosted when a third candidate, Chung Mong Joon, an heir to the
Hyundai business fortune, withdrew with a promise to "do my best to make him
win."

Some skeptics in the administration say that Mr. Roh owes a political debt to
Mr. Chung, and that the Hyundai business combine is South Korea's biggest
advocate of increasing investment and economic ties to North Korea.

But administration officials acknowledge that two overriding factors are
pressing the United States to listening to South Korea's pleas for a more
accommodating approach to the North in coming months. The first, some say, is
that the administration's hard-liners are preoccupied right now by planning a
possible war against Iraq and don't want to be distracted.

Second, officials say, is the ongoing reality that North Korea, with its
immense armed forces of a million troops, plus a formidable rocket and
artillery arsenal, could destroy Seoul and its environs in retaliation against
any military pressure by the United States and its allies.

South Korean diplomats say they cringe when they hear some in the
administration speak of placing so much economic pressure on North Korea that
it collapses. Few South Koreans say they want an economic collapse by the
North, because they fear that such a move would devastate the South Korean
economic machine even more than the collapse of East Germany damaged the west.

Even President Kim, the foremost advocate of harmony with the North, states
that reunification should take decades. South Korea's best bet, South Korean
officials say, is to negotiate a settlement of the current confrontation,
using economic incentives if necessary if North Korea agrees to stop its
nuclear ambitions.

Some in the Bush administration say they favor imposing economic sanctions in
the future if North Korea does not reverse course. Secretary Powell said last
weekend that such a course of action is not being contemplated by anyone.

Some experts say the next point of contention will be whether to continue any
assistance to build the light-water reactors that North Korea has been
counting on under the 1994 "framework agreement." Administration officials say
no decision has been made on that issue.

Administration officials do not rule out economic blandishments for North
Korea in the future, but they reject talk of such actions in advance of
positive steps by the North.

"We'll talk to the North Koreans eventually," said one official. "But they
have to do something first. The ball really is in their court."

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Copyright 2003 The New York Times Company