Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein:
The U.S. Tilts toward Iraq, 1980-1984

US/Iraq relations, early 1980s 
 
Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein:
The U.S. Tilts toward Iraq, 1980-1984
 
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No.82
 
Edited by Joyce Battle
February 25, 2003

 
 
The Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) was one of a series of
crises during an era of upheaval in the Middle East:
revolution in Iran, occupation of the U.S. embassy in
Tehran by militant students, invasion of the Great
Mosque in Mecca by anti-royalist Islamicists, the Soviet
Union's occupation of Afghanistan, and internecine
fighting among Syrians, Israelis, and Palestinians in
Lebanon. The war followed months of rising tension
between the Iranian Islamic republic and secular
nationalist Iraq. In mid-September 1980 Iraq attacked,
in the mistaken belief that Iranian political disarray
would guarantee a quick victory.
 
The international community responded with U.N. Security
Council resolutions calling for a ceasefire and for all
member states to refrain from actions contributing in
any way to the conflict's continuation. The Soviets,
opposing the war, cut off arms exports to Iran and to
Iraq, its ally under a 1972 treaty (arms deliveries
resumed in 1982). The U.S. had already ended, when the
shah fell, previously massive military sales to Iran. In
1980 the U.S. broke off diplomatic relations with Iran
because of the Tehran embassy hostage crisis; Iraq had
broken off ties with the U.S. during the 1967 Arab-
Israeli war.
 
The U.S. was officially neutral regarding the Iran-Iraq
war, and claimed that it armed neither side. Iran
depended on U.S.-origin weapons, however, and sought
them from Israel, Europe, Asia, and South America. Iraq
started the war with a large Soviet-supplied arsenal,
but needed additional weaponry as the conflict wore on.
 
Initially, Iraq advanced far into Iranian territory, but
was driven back within months. By mid-1982, Iraq was on
the defensive against Iranian human-wave attacks. The
U.S., having decided that an Iranian victory would not
serve its interests, began supporting Iraq: measures
already underway to upgrade U.S.-Iraq relations were
accelerated, high-level officials exchanged visits, and
in February 1982 the State Department removed Iraq from
its list of states supporting international terrorism.
(It had been included several years earlier because of
ties with several Palestinian nationalist groups, not
Islamicists sharing the worldview of al-Qaeda. Activism
by Iraq's main Shiite Islamicist opposition group, al-
Dawa, was a major factor precipitating the war --
stirred by Iran's Islamic revolution, its endeavors
included the attempted assassination of Iraqi Foreign
Minister Tariq Aziz.)
 
Prolonging the war was phenomenally expensive. Iraq
received massive external financial support from the
Gulf states, and assistance through loan programs from
the U.S. The White House and State Department pressured
the Export-Import Bank to provide Iraq with financing,
to enhance its credit standing and enable it to obtain
loans from other international financial institutions.
The U.S. Agriculture Department provided taxpayer-
guaranteed loans for purchases of American commodities,
to the satisfaction of U.S. grain exporters.
 
The U.S. restored formal relations with Iraq in November
1984, but the U.S. had begun, several years earlier, to
provide it with intelligence and military support (in
secret and contrary to this country's official
neutrality) in accordance with policy directives from
President Ronald Reagan. These were prepared pursuant to
his March 1982 National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM
4-82) asking for a review of U.S. policy toward the
Middle East.
 
One of these directives from Reagan, National Security
Decision Directive (NSDD) 99, signed on July 12, 1983,
is available only in a highly redacted version [Document
21]. It reviews U.S. regional interests in the Middle
East and South Asia, and U.S. objectives, including
peace between Israel and the Arabs, resolution of other
regional conflicts, and economic and military
improvements, "to strengthen regional stability." It
deals with threats to the U.S., strategic planning,
cooperation with other countries, including the Arab
states, and plans for action. An interdepartmental
review of the implications of shifting policy in favor
of Iraq was conducted following promulgation of the
directive.
 
By the summer of 1983 Iran had been reporting Iraqi use
of using chemical weapons for some time. The Geneva
protocol requires that the international community
respond to chemical warfare, but a diplomatically
isolated Iran received only a muted response to its
complaints [Note 1]. It intensified its accusations in
October 1983, however, and in November asked for a
United Nations Security Council investigation.
 
The U.S., which followed developments in the Iran-Iraq
war with extraordinary intensity, had intelligence
confirming Iran's accusations, and describing Iraq's
"almost daily" use of chemical weapons, concurrent with
its policy review and decision to support Iraq in the
war [Document 24]. The intelligence indicated that Iraq
used chemical weapons against Iranian forces, and,
according to a November 1983 memo, against "Kurdish
insurgents" as well [Document 25].
 
What was the Reagan administration's response? A State
Department account indicates that the administration had
decided to limit its "efforts against the Iraqi CW
program to close monitoring because of our strict
neutrality in the Gulf war, the sensitivity of sources,
and the low probability of achieving desired results."
But the department noted in late November 1983 that
"with the essential assistance of foreign firms, Iraq
ha[d] become able to deploy and use CW and probably has
built up large reserves of CW for further use. Given its
desperation to end the war, Iraq may again use lethal or
incapacitating CW, particularly if Iran threatens to
break through Iraqi lines in a large-scale attack"
[Document 25]. The State Department argued that the U.S.
needed to respond in some way to maintain the
credibility of its official opposition to chemical
warfare, and recommended that the National Security
Council discuss the issue.
 
Following further high-level policy review, Ronald
Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive
(NSDD) 114, dated November 26, 1983, concerned
specifically with U.S. policy toward the Iran-Iraq war.
The directive reflects the administration's priorities:
it calls for heightened regional military cooperation to
defend oil facilities, and measures to improve U.S.
military capabilities in the Persian Gulf, and directs
the secretaries of state and defense and the chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take appropriate measures
to respond to tensions in the area. It states, "Because
of the real and psychological impact of a curtailment in
the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf on the
international economic system, we must assure our
readiness to deal promptly with actions aimed at
disrupting that traffic." It does not mention chemical
weapons [Document 26].
 
Soon thereafter, Donald Rumsfeld (who had served in
various positions in the Nixon and Ford administrations,
including as President Ford's defense secretary, and at
this time headed the multinational pharmaceutical
company G.D. Searle & Co.) was dispatched to the Middle
East as a presidential envoy. His December 1983 tour of
regional capitals included Baghdad, where he was to
establish "direct contact between an envoy of President
Reagan and President Saddam Hussein," while emphasizing
"his close relationship" with the president [Document 28].
Rumsfeld met with Saddam, and the two discussed
regional issues of mutual interest, shared enmity toward
Iran and Syria, and the U.S.'s efforts to find
alternative routes to transport Iraq's oil; its
facilities in the Persian Gulf had been shut down by
Iran, and Iran's ally, Syria, had cut off a pipeline
that transported Iraqi oil through its territory.
Rumsfeld made no reference to chemical weapons,
according to detailed notes on the meeting [Document 31].
 
Rumsfeld also met with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq
Aziz, and the two agreed, "the U.S. and Iraq shared many
common interests." Rumsfeld affirmed the Reagan
administration's "willingness to do more" regarding the
Iran-Iraq war, but "made clear that our efforts to
assist were inhibited by certain things that made it
difficult for us, citing the use of chemical weapons,
possible escalation in the Gulf, and human rights." He
then moved on to other U.S. concerns [Document 32].
Later, Rumsfeld was assured by the U.S. interests
section that Iraq's leadership had been "extremely
pleased" with the visit, and that "Tariq Aziz had gone
out of his way to praise Rumsfeld as a person" [Document 36 
and Document 37].

Rumsfeld returned to Baghdad in late March 1984. By this
time, the U.S. had publicly condemned Iraq's chemical
weapons use, stating, "The United States has concluded
that the available evidence substantiates Iran's charges
that Iraq used chemical weapons" [Document 47].
Briefings for Rumsfeld's meetings noted that
atmospherics in Iraq had deteriorated since his December
visit because of Iraqi military reverses and because
"bilateral relations were sharply set back by our March
5 condemnation of Iraq for CW use, despite our repeated
warnings that this issue would emerge sooner or later"
[Document 48]. Rumsfeld was to discuss with Iraqi
officials the Reagan administration's hope that it could
obtain Export-Import Bank credits for Iraq, the Aqaba
pipeline, and its vigorous efforts to cut off arms
exports to Iran. According to an affidavit prepared by
one of Rumsfeld's companions during his Mideast travels,
former NSC staff member Howard Teicher, Rumsfeld also
conveyed to Iraq an offer from Israel to provide
assistance, which was rejected [Document 61].
 
Although official U.S. policy still barred the export of
U.S. military equipment to Iraq, some was evidently
provided on a "don't ask - don't tell" basis. In April
1984, the Baghdad interests section asked to be kept
apprised of Bell Helicopter Textron's negotiations to
sell helicopters to Iraq, which were not to be "in any
way configured for military use" [Document 55]. The
purchaser was the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. In December
1982, Bell Textron's Italian subsidiary had informed the
U.S. embassy in Rome that it turned down a request from
Iraq to militarize recently purchased Hughes
helicopters. An allied government, South Korea, informed
the State Department that it had received a similar
request in June 1983 (when a congressional aide asked in
March 1983 whether heavy trucks recently sold to Iraq
were intended for military purposes, a State Department
official replied "we presumed that this was Iraq's
intention, and had not asked.") [Document 44]
 
During the spring of 1984 the U.S. reconsidered policy
for the sale of dual-use equipment to Iraq's nuclear
program, and its "preliminary results favor[ed]
expanding such trade to include Iraqi nuclear entities"
[Document 57]. Several months later, a Defense
Intelligence Agency analysis said that even after the
war ended, Iraq was likely to "continue to develop its
formidable conventional and chemical capability, and
probably pursue nuclear weapons" [Document 58]. (Iraq is
situated in a dangerous neighborhood, and Israel had
stockpiled a large nuclear weapons arsenal without
international censure. Nuclear nonproliferation was not
a high priority of the Reagan administration -
throughout the 1980s it downplayed Pakistan's nuclear
program, though its intelligence indicated that a
weapons capability was being pursued, in order to avert
congressionally mandated sanctions. Sanctions would have
impeded the administration's massive military assistance
to Pakistan provided in return for its support of the
mujahideen fighting the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan.)
 
In February 1984, Iraq's military, expecting a major
Iranian attack, issued a warning that "the invaders
should know that for every harmful insect there is an
insecticide capable of annihilating it whatever the
number and Iraq possesses this annihilation insecticide"
[Document 41]. On March 3, the State Department
intervened to prevent a U.S. company from shipping
22,000 pounds of phosphorous fluoride, a chemical
weapons precursor, to Iraq. Washington instructed the
U.S. interests section to protest to the Iraqi
government, and to inform the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs that "we anticipate making a public condemnation
of Iraqi use of chemical weapons in the near future,"
and that "we are adamantly opposed to Iraq's attempting
to acquire the raw materials, equipment, or expertise to
manufacture chemical weapons from the United States.
When we become aware of attempts to do so, we will act
to prevent their export to Iraq" [Document 42].
 
The public condemnation was issued on March 5. It said,
"While condemning Iraq's chemical weapons use . . . The
United States finds the present Iranian regime's
intransigent refusal to deviate from its avowed
objective of eliminating the legitimate government of
neighboring Iraq to be inconsistent with the accepted
norms of behavior among nations and the moral and
religious basis which it claims" [Document 43].
 
Later in the month, the State Department briefed the
press on its decision to strengthen controls on the
export of chemical weapons precursors to Iran and Iraq,
in response to intelligence and media reports that
precursors supplied to Iraq originated in Western
countries. When asked whether the U.S.'s conclusion that
Iraq had used chemical weapons would have "any effect on
U.S. recent initiatives to expand commercial
relationships with Iraq across a broad range, and also a
willingness to open diplomatic relations," the
department's spokesperson said "No. I'm not aware of any
change in our position. We're interested in being
involved in a closer dialogue with Iraq" [Document 52].
 
Iran had submitted a draft resolution asking the U.N. to
condemn Iraq's chemical weapons use. The U.S. delegate
to the U.N. was instructed to lobby friendly delegations
in order to obtain a general motion of "no decision" on
the resolution. If this was not achievable, the U.S.
delegate was to abstain on the issue. Iraq's ambassador
met with the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., Jeane
Kirkpatrick, and asked for "restraint" in responding to
the issue - as did the representatives of both France
and Britain.
 
A senior U.N. official who had participated in a fact-
finding mission to investigate Iran's complaint
commented "Iranians may well decide to manufacture and
use chemical weapons themselves if [the] international
community does not condemn Iraq. He said Iranian
assembly speaker Rafsanjani [had] made public statements
to this effect" [Document 50].
 
Iraqi interests section head Nizar Hamdoon met with
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State James Placke on
March 29. Hamdoon said that Iraq strongly preferred a
Security Council presidential statement to a resolution,
and wanted the response to refer to former resolutions
on the war, progress toward ending the conflict, but to
not identify any specific country as responsible for
chemical weapons use. Placke said the U.S. could accept
Iraqi proposals if the Security Council went along. He
asked for the Iraqi government's help "in avoiding . . .
embarrassing situation[s]" but also noted that the U.S.
did "not want this issue to dominate our bilateral
relationship" [Document 54].
 
On March 30, 1984, the Security Council issued a
presidential statement condemning the use of chemical
weapons, without naming Iraq as the offending party. A
State Department memo circulating the draft text
observed that, "The statement, by the way contains all
three elements Hamdoon wanted" [Document 51].
 
On April 5, 1984, Ronald Reagan issued another
presidential directive (NSDD 139), emphasizing the U.S.
objective of ensuring access to military facilities in
the Gulf region, and instructing the director of central
intelligence and the secretary of defense to upgrade
U.S. intelligence gathering capabilities. It codified
U.S. determination to develop plans "to avert an Iraqi
collapse." Reagan's directive said that U.S. policy
required "unambiguous" condemnation of chemical warfare
(without naming Iraq), while including the caveat that
the U.S. should "place equal stress on the urgent need
to dissuade Iran from continuing the ruthless and
inhumane tactics which have characterized recent
offensives." The directive does not suggest that
"condemning" chemical warfare required any hesitation
about or modification of U.S. support for Iraq [Document  53].
 
A State Department background paper dated November 16,
1984 said that Iraq had stopped using chemical weapons
after a November 1983 demarche from the U.S., but had
resumed their use in February 1984. On November 26,
1984, Iraq and the U.S. restored diplomatic relations.
Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, in Washington for the
formal resumption of ties, met with Secretary of State
George Shultz. When their discussion turned to the Iran-
Iraq war, Aziz said that his country was satisfied that
"the U.S. analysis of the war's threat to regional
stability is 'in agreement in principle' with Iraq's,"
and expressed thanks for U.S. efforts to cut off
international arms sales to Iran. He said that "Iraq's
superiority in weaponry" assured Iraq's defense. Shultz,
with presumed sardonic intent, "remarked that superior
intelligence must also be an important factor in Iraq's
defense;" Tariq Aziz had to agree [Document 60].
 
Conclusion
 
The current Bush administration discusses Iraq in
starkly moralistic terms to further its goal of
persuading a skeptical world that a preemptive and
premeditated attack on Iraq could and should be
supported as a "just war." The documents included in
this briefing book reflect the realpolitik that
determined this country's policies during the years when
Iraq was actually employing chemical weapons. Actual
rather than rhetorical opposition to such use was
evidently not perceived to serve U.S. interests;
instead, the Reagan administration did not deviate from
its determination that Iraq was to serve as the
instrument to prevent an Iranian victory. Chemical
warfare was viewed as a potentially embarrassing public
relations problem that complicated efforts to provide
assistance. The Iraqi government's repressive internal
policies, though well known to the U.S. government at
the time, did not figure at all in the presidential
directives that established U.S. policy toward the Iran-
Iraq war. The U.S. was concerned with its ability to
project military force in the Middle East, and to keep
the oil flowing.
 
Most of the information in this briefing book, in its
broad outlines, has been available for years. Some of it
was recorded in contemporaneous news reports; a few
investigative reporters uncovered much more - especially
after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. A particular debt is
owed to the late representative Henry Gonzales
(1916-2000), Democrat of Texas, whose staff extensively
investigated U.S. policy toward Iraq during the 1980s
and who would not be deterred from making information
available to the public [Note 2]. Almost all of the
primary documents included in this briefing book were
obtained by the National Security Archive through the
Freedom of Information Act and were published in 1995
[Note 3].