African Trade Agenda

Africa Trade Network crits of neoliberalism/WTO/NEPAD 
 
African Trade Agenda

Third World Network-Africa Number 5 December  2002

Inside

WTO: Failures signal hard battles ahead
pages 1-4

NEPAD's Slippery Milestones
pages 4-6

Dateline Africa
pages 6-9

Global Trade Round-Up
pages 9- 11

Notice Board
page 11 -12


WTO NEGOTIATIONS
Failures signal harder battles ahead

by Tetteh Hormeku, TWN-Africa

Thanks to the obduracy of its most powerful members, the World Trade
Organisation ended a year of negotiations on December 20, 2002, unable to
meet any of the year-end deadlines for agreement on the issues of priority
concern for developing countries.   Not only does this question the
developed countries' sincerity over the much-touted Doha 'development'
agenda; it is also likely to further complicate the negotiating agenda for
2003, and task the already over-stretched negotiating resources of most
developing countries,  in the heated preparations towards the fifth WTO
Ministerial Conference in September.

Negotiations in the WTO were expected to deliver on three key issues for
developing countries by the end of the 2002.  These were: essential
medicines for countries lacking capacity to manufacture such drugs
themselves; special and differential treatment for developing countries; and
resolving the difficulties faced by developing countries in the
implementation (including the imbalances and inequities) of existing
agreements.

Failure in all these areas has led a scramble to salvage some hope in the
early part of the new year.  The Chairman of the TRIPS Council is expected
to start renewed consultations by mid-January 2003, with the General Council
(of the WTO members) meeting reconsider the situation in mid-February.
Similarly, the Chair of the Special Session of the Committee on Trade and
Development, which is dealing with the issue of S&D, will make another
effort for February.

WTO Director-General, Supachai Panitchpakdi, in expressing disappointment
over the failure to meet the deadlines, stated that the "issues are of great
importance . to the broader trade negotiations that are part of the Doha
Development Agenda".  However, common to the impasse in all the areas
mentioned has been the dogged determination of the WTO major powers- the US,
Canada, EU and Japan - to narrow even further the scope of, and/or
frustrate, those elements of the Doha decision of direct interest to
developing countries.

On the issue of essential medicines, the United States single-handedly
wrecked agreement on a decision to enable countries with little or no
manufacturing capacity to make effective use of compulsory licensing (as per
paragraph 6 of the Doha declaration on TRIPS and Public Health) for quick
and affordable access to needed drugs.

After the dramatic rejection of his 24 November draft text by the African
group (see African Trade Agenda no 4), the Chairman of the TRIPS Council
submitted a new draft on 16 December.   Most WTO members, even though they
still had some reservations, were willing to approve the draft.

The United States, however, rejected the draft because it wanted to limit
the coverage of the diseases which would benefit under the deal.  Most of
the other countries, to say the least, found it unconscionable that trade
ambassadors were to be given the power to select which of the many diseases
afflicting the poor should be eligible for drugs on a quick and affordable
basis.

The United States chose to try and bully the developing countries into
submission, and up till 2300 hours on 20 December, diplomats from these
countries were being dragged into one 'green room' meeting after another to
try and accommodate the US.   By the early hours of morning of 21 December,
as the US,  refusing to budge, but not getting its way either, decided to
block the consensus, the members had no choice but to acknowledge failure.

Developing countries have stated that they will re-submit their own concerns
if the US insists on its position.  Thus, come the renewed consultations in
January,  the US stance is set to unravel the negotiated package as it
exists, and drag any possible solution on quick and affordable access to
essential medicines for the poor.

The TRIPS and Public Health saga is a clearest example of the determination
of the major powers of the WTO seeking to undo the elements of the Doha
decisions of immediate concern to developing countries.

For most developing countries, paragraph 6 of the Doha declaration is, in
the words of the Africa group, clear and definitive on the issue of
effective use of compulsory licence to enable countries, which could not
make drugs themselves to have access to those drugs to address their public
health concerns.

All through the negotiations, however, one developed country after another
has sought to introduce conditions, which effectively re-defined the Doha
mandate, and made whatever solution emerged unworkable.  While the US was
insisting on removing some diseases from the coverage, Japan wanted to
exclude vaccines, the EU wanted strict definitions of what constitutes
manufacturing capacity, and so on (ATA no 4).

As the Indian Ambassador is quoted as saying at the final meeting of the
TRIPS council, it was sometimes not clear "whether the Council was
discussing how to facilitate access to drugs at affordable prices to poor
people or how to restrict the scope and ambit of the intended solution."
(SUNS, 5260)

On the issue of special and differential rights for developing countries,
the failure to reach a decision in December represents the second time the
deadline was missed: the original deadline was for July 2002.    In the face
of the continuing obduracy of the developed country counter-parts, most
developing countries are unwilling to devote more negotiating resources to
what they believe to be a fruitless exercise, preferring rather to declare
the negotiations a failure and refer the matter to the Ministers in Cancun.

The failure lies in the unwillingness by developed countries to take the
Doha mandate faithfully.  Doha mandated WTO members to find ways to make
existing S&D provisions more effective and operational, consider new ways of
enhancing them, and incorporate S&Ds into the entire WTO architecture.

The developed countries, however, have been opposed to any proposals that
world either change the language of the WTO agreements or the 'balance of
Members' rights and obligations.  That is, opposed to the changes that are
required to give meaning to the Doha mandate.  Instead, they have chosen to
focus on so-called cross cutting issues, including a mechanism to monitor
the use of S&D provisions even before the actual provisions are discussed
and agreed upon.  (The idea of a monitoring mechanism is a proposal by the
Africa group, but which the developed countries have, in typical fashion
appropriated for abuse).  In addition, they have also demanded that the S&D
be addressed in subsidiary bodies of the WTO.

The large majority of the developing countries, however, have been
demanding, on the basis of their (correct) interpretation of the Doha
mandate, the review and operationalisation of all the individual S&D
provisions, before considering cross-cutting items.  They are also averse to
referring the issues to subsidiary bodies.  This is because they lack the
resources to pursue the negotiations in different bodies at the same time,
as well their experience where issues referred to such bodies are buried.

In the end, the developed countries have taken an obstructive approach to
most of the proposals that developing countries, in particular the African
countries, have put forward, and this in sometimes most farcical ways.

For instance, in response to the proposal of the African group to restate
that Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures should not be used to restrict
trade from developing and least-developed country members, the US simply
comments that this was already included in the Uruguay Round Agreement and
that nothing more needs to be done.

In relation to the other proposal to include S&D commitments in the
schedules of commitments under the Agreement on Agriculture, the US retorted
that this would amount to unacceptable re-negotiation of the Uruguay Round
Agreement.

And yet in both cases, it was precisely in recognition of the fact that the
Uruguay Round Agreement as it stands imposed undue obligations on the weak
and vulnerable countries that the Doha decision was taken to strengthen and
expand the scope of S&D obligations.

Indeed, in sharp contrast to the underlying logic of the Doha mandate,
United States has come out in opposition to any thing more that short-time
frames for adjustment as far as S&D is concerned, arguing that what was
needed was full and complete integration of the developing  countries into
the WTO system as early as possible, with all members enjoying the same
rights and responsibilities.

The implementation question has been caught in a similar vice as two other
issues above.  By the close of the year, there has been little progress over
the 80 odd implementation issues identified in Doha for redress.  Indeed,
the frustration with the slow progress in this area had spilled into a
debate as to the appropriate forum for the redress of these issues.
The EC (for its own reasons of wanting to extend Geographical Indications to
other products) has proposed that all implementation issues be brought up to
the level of the TNC, with agreement to be reached by August 2003.  Many
developing countries, including India and Brazil,  who are pushing for
greater emphasis on implementation issues, supported the EC's idea of
bringing up implementation issues to the TNC.  The US, Australia, New
Zealand and some agriculture-exporting Latin American countries have opposed
this.

Behind developing country frustration with the progress has, again, been the
deliberate efforts by the developed countries to derail the implementation
discussions.

In all these manoeuvres, the major powers have been ready to resort to bully
and pressure to achieve their aims.  As it emerged in October that the then
Asst US Trade Rep, Rosa Whitaker, has written letters to African
governments, citing their AGOA privileges, and telling them to protect these
privileges by instructing their negotiators in Geneva to follow the US
position on both the textiles negotiations and trips and public health.  As
is well known, this was just a tip of the blackmailing iceberg weighing down
on African and other developing countries.

At the same time as they are thus working to undermine and/or restrict the
scope of the Doha decisions that concerns developing countries, the major
powers have been seeking to push forward and widen the scope of those areas
that they have imposed.   In meetings such as those of the Working Groups on
investment, competition and government procurement, the developed countries
have come seeking to include in the discussions, topics that have been
excluded in the Doha declaration.

Thus, the US has argued for the inclusion of portfolio investment in the
discussion of investment rules, while others have sought to include
investor-to-state dispute settlement mechanisms a la NAFTA - both of which
have been left out in the Doha declaration.

Tellingly, at the 9 December meeting of the TNC, in the midst of all the
tensions over the looming failure over the issues over trips and health, and
implementation issues, the EU and Japan sought to push the Singapore issues
into the agenda, arguing that without them there would be no comprehensive
agenda.  The US then re-iterated its position on portfolio investment.

Thus the failures to meet the end of year deadlines on issues of importance
to the developing countries fit a pattern: the major powers downgrade those
issues of the developing countries, while pushing theirs to the fore, and in
support of this, they are prepared to employ all their skills and resources
for blackmail.

These are ominous signs indeed for the negotiations in the year 2003, as
they gather steam towards Cancun.



NEPAD's slippery milestones

by Yao Graham, TWN-Africa

Despite promises of support from fora to fora (Monterrey, G-8, WSSD) NEPAD
does not yet look anywhere near attracting the external resources that its
promoters insist is crucial for its implementation. The international
climate- the growing militarist unilateralism, of the US, the hardball
posture of the QUAD in the WTO over TRIPS and public health and
Implementation issues, US arm-twisting of African delegations over the
abolition of textile quotas, the announced terms of access to the US's
Millennium Challenge Account - point to the G-8 seeking to exact a very high
price for whatever resources they commit to NEPAD.  In the nine months
leading up to the critical Cancun 5th ministerial meeting of the WTO,
African trade concessions in exchange for promises of support for NEPAD look
an obvious soft underbelly for the G-8 to kick. Will this tried and tested
trick, which has regularly failed to deliver for Africa, work again?

The G-8 supporters of NEPAD insist that the African Peer Review Mechanism
(APRM) is the jewel in NEPAD's crown and have clearly predicated the amount
and quality of their financial support on it.  NEPAD's political
difficulties in Western circles have not been helped by how the prognosis of
the APRM has become entangled with the controversies over Zimbabwe. The
confusion about the character and scope of the APRM late in 2002 meant the
year ended on a bad and defensive note for the promoters of NEPAD. ((See
African Trade Agenda, No. 3). This confusion was only partially redeemed by
the majority decision at the 5th meeting of the Heads of State
Implementation Committee (HSIC) affirming the APRM as covering political,
civil as well as economic and social issues. This was a bad signal to G-8
sceptics. Despite South Africa's refusal to be pushed, by Britain and its
allies, into a frontal confrontation with the ZANU-PF regime, vaulting the
bar set by the West in Kananaskis, on governance, economic liberalisation,
etc. remains important for the leaders of NEPAD.

Increasing the numbers of African countries that sign up to the APRM is one
of the key challenges Mbeki, Obasanjo and company face in 2003, as they
strive to deliver on the agreements they reached with the G-8 in Kananaskis.
Good governance is something African leaders owe first and foremost to their
own people but have typically preferred to make it a condition of their
relationship with the continent's creditors. The stumbling over the terms
and processes of the APRM is one unsurprising result of having to hurriedly
fashion a mechanism for monitoring an aid conditionality.

By the end of 2002 it was clear the framers of NEPAD were belatedly striving
to respond to the raft of criticisms levelled at the Programme, be it the
strategy of critical dependence on foreign resources, the scant respect for
good governance in how the strategy was fashioned, the relationship between
NEPAD and existing continental structures, notably the African Union.
Various meetings of African leaders and new documents have adopted positions
which even if only implicitly and weakly try to respond to views raised
mainly by organisations of civil society.

Speaking in Kananaskis President Thabo Mbeki angrily denounced those who he
accused of presenting African leaders as having journeyed to Alberta to beg
for aid. In October a meeting of African Finance Ministers, following firmer
statements in recent NEPAD documents about a leading role for domestic
accumulation in NEPAD's investment strategy, talked about the need to
support the development of domestic private enterprise.  The same meeting
called for a better explanation of NEPAD to all 'development partners'.
There have been especially intensified efforts at national levels to explain
the programme to members of legislatures.

The lines of controversy around NEPAD have settled into a clear pattern:
African and G-8 governments on one side stoutly defending NEPAD and
campaigning hard for it, largely supported by foreign capital, with civil
society organisations raising important critical queries many of which were
reflected by African business sectors. Legislatures in most countries
struggled to understand what was going on. For example in February Tony
Blair sang a paean to NEPAD before a Ghanaian Parliament most of whose
members had never seen the NEPAD document.

In meeting after meeting - the African Social Forum in February, a
TWN-CODESRIA conference in Accra, a Heinrich Boll event in Nairobi, a CIDA
organised event in Canada, the 3rd African Development Forum, a parallel
meeting to the Durban AU Summit, and numerous other meetings organised by
labour unions, faith based organisations, women's organisations and other
CSOs at national and supranational levels - CSOs questioned the neo-liberal
economic strategy at the heart of NEPAD, its optimistic expectations of
foreign resource inflows, its analysis of globalisation,  its gender
blindness, the ambiguity and tensions in its relations with existing
continental organisations, its governance defects.

Two main postures have resulted from this critique. Both of them recognise
that NEPAD has pushed the issue of a continental development vision sharply
to the fore but differ on how to respond to the specific admittedly flawed
strategy embodied in NEPAD. One tendency argues that NEPAD is so
fundamentally flawed; the constellation of forces supporting it is inimical
to Africa's development interests that it cannot be salvaged. The other
tendency argues for a constructive engagement with the NEPAD, believing that
it can be corrected to respond to CSOs' critical concerns.

2002 witnessed the flowering of a NEPAD meeting circuit in and outside
Africa with a growing participation of CSOs. The industry is yet to yield
major changes on the most important concerns raised by CSOs.

From Monterrey through Kananaskis to Sandton the promoters have had a good
year. In March the UN Financing for Development Conference (FfD) endorsed
NEPAD, setting in motion a procession of endorsements by major international
gatherings. The endorsement by the WSSD hosted by South Africa in September
must have politically the most satisfying for South Africa's Thabo Mbeki but
the G-8 Africa Action Plan adopted in Kananaskis in June was the most
significant. Side by side with this have been the numerous visits to Africa
by G-8 politicians and African politicians to the North as travelling
salespersons for NEPAD.

So we have the perverse and sadly all too familiar situation of African
leaders been cheered on by foreign politicians in the face of the scepticism
and even hostility of the local population.




Date-line Africa

BENIN
UN funds GMfood project
(Cotonou, Dec 6 IPS) - The UN Environment Programme (UNEP) has granted
170,000 U.S. dollars for a project on the implications Genetically Modified
Organisms (GMOs) for Benin. The grant comes just eight months after the
government imposed a five-year moratorium on the ''import, trade and use of
all GMOs or GMO-derived products'' in Benin.

The project, which kicks off in December, will last 18 months. Benin is also
planning to conduct a study on the presence of GMOs within its territory and
demand labeling of products containing GMOs, according to Raphael Ogounchi
of the ministry of environment.  A draft bill - to keep GMOs out of Benin -
will be tabled in parliament soon by the government.

Experts from the ministries of Environment and Agriculture promised that the
five-year ban would be upheld.


BURKINA FASO
Government to import electricity; donors ask for privatisation
(Ouagadougou, IPS) Growing demands for power supply have prompted Burkina
Faso to import electricity from neighbouring Cote d'Ivoire. A
225,000-high-voltage power line is being planned for 2005 to  connect the
city of Ferkessedougou in northern Cote d'Ivoire with Ouagadougou allowing
additional 90 megawatts of electricity to supply the Burkinabe capital.

Donors, meeting in Ouagadougou recently, agreed to bankroll the
56-billion-CFA (about 86.153 million U.S. dollars) project.  However, the
donors-comprising the World Bank, the West African Development Bank, the
French Development Agency, and the Danish Development Agency-have urged the
government to speed up the privatisation of SONABEL (the country's state
owned electricity body) to improve efficiency.
Labour unions have opposed the privatisation of the country's electricity,
water and telephone companies, which they have described as '' selling-off
our national assets to the highest bidder''
Finance Minister Baptiste Compaore, told IPS late December that the
government's plans to reform SONABEL are on course, but the government wants
to proceed slowly in order to avoid problems encountered by other countries.

GHANA
IMF demands more privatisation, higher electricity prices, and lower wages
(Accra, 19 December) An IMF mission to Ghana, from Dec 2 -11, reached an
understanding with the Government of Ghana for a new poverty reduction and
growth facility programme to address four key issues: namely larger than
expected wage bill, expenditure management controls; divestiture of state
assets, and the pricing of petroleum products.

According to a recent report of a 13 December de-briefing on the IMF
mission,  the mission was part of on-going negotiations since September or
earlier in the context of the previous IMF programme, which expired in
November without extension and without completing the previous review.  The
review to date had revealed that the Ghana Government was not meeting
targets in various areas.  Both sides agreed to let the previous programme
expire without renewal, or completion of the review.

Another mission in January 2003 will attempt to finalise the letter of
intent and macro-economic framework for an IMF programme.  The Government of
Ghana will then have to pass a budget reflecting the understanding reached
in the two documents and on the key issues outlined above, and take steps to
'adjust' the price of petroleum.   The new programme will then be discussed
by the IMF Board, for possible approval in April.

The discussions also concerned the willingness of donor to move forward with
bilateral programmes without an IMF programme in place.  Most donors were
ready to move cautiously, with the first tranche of funding released after
the IMF board approval.

On the relation between IMF conditionality and the Ghana Poverty Reduction
Strategy (GPRS) the IMF stated that it was pushing for the GPRS to be linked
with the budget, and assumes that there will be some adjustment of the GPRS
to fit with the budget.  The World Bank added that the GPRS has not yet been
submitted to the  joint IMF/World Bank boards, as the Bank had demanded some
changes in the GPRS before submission to the board.

As to the likely impact of the IMF demands on the poor, the IMF stated that
it had not looked into that aspect, and that such impacts would not be known
for some time.

UGANDA
Absence of supportive industrial policy hurts local manufacturers (Kampala,
December 10, The Monitor)  -  The absence of a supportive policy on local
industries has created condition for several local investors being edged out
of business, the principal of Makerere University Business School, Wasswa
Balunywa has said. He said this in his address to participants during the
9th Annual International Management Conference at Entebbe on Nov 6, on the
theme "Innovation and Industrialisation - The way ahead for developing
countries".
According to Wasswa, lack of support for local industry has enabled the
flooding of Uganda with subsidised and cheap agro-processed products from
America, hurting the Agro-processing business in Uganda.  Industries which
used to support local ground nut, cotton, cashew nuts and the Soya beans
out-growers, no longer buy from the farmers," he said. Industries have also
cut production of cooking oil because they could not compete with the cheap
heavily subsidised cooking oil from the United States. He suggested, "Uganda
should come up with an industrial policy that will identify key sectors in
the economy to spur growth."

ZAMBIA
Controversy stalls rail concessioning
(Lusaka, December 11, The Times of Zambia) -  Canac, a Canadian firm is
causing a delay in the signing of the contract on the concessioning of
Zambia Railways Limited (ZRL), because it feels it should have been awarded
the tender.

Canac was picked as the second preferred bidder on a fall-back position in
case there was a problem with the preferred candidates, the New Limpopo
Project Investments (NLPI) in consortium with Spoornet. Now Canac wants the
Zambia Privatisation Agency (ZPA) to cancel the tender awarded to the NLPI
consortium and negotiate with them.  Times investigations have revealed that
though Canac did not qualify to be the second preferred bidder, it was
picked as a fall-back position. Sources said Canac fell far short of what
the ZPA was looking for in a company to take over the operations of the
Zambia Railways Limited. Other companies that had bid for the concessioning
programme include Sheltam Group of South Africa and Cana-Rail of Canada.

US to give Zambia non-GM food
(Lusaka, Dec 6, Reuters) - The US may have finally bowed to pressure from
the international community.  It now promises to supply 30000 tonnes of
unmodified grain to Zambia. With a deficit of 630000 tonnes of food, Zambia
refused to accept GM maize sent by the US in August.  Many nations supported
the Zambian people's right to choice and have acted to defend Zambia by
providing non-GM food aid or cash to buy it. The US has finally admitted
that it has non-GM grain available and the US ambassador to Zambia has said
the US would supply Zambia with 15000 tonnes of sorghum and 15000t of wheat.


SOUTH AFRICA
USAid sponsors report to promote water privatisation
(December 9, Financial Times)

The US Agency for International Development (USAid) has sponsored a report
that backs the idea of water privatisation in South Africa, sparking
complaints that it is interfering in domestic politics.  The report by
Padco, a Washington-based consultancy under contract to USAid, has been
circulated at donors' meetings in South Africa.

The report targets critics of water privatisation - particularly within
South Africa's strong trade union movement - in a bid to persuade
municipalities of the merits of private involvement. The unions have
criticised sharp rises in water tariffs and lack of delivery of water and
sanitation in poor rural communities.

The Padco report purports to reject the claim that water privatisation has
caused higher prices across the developing world, citing controversial cases
in Buenos Aires, Guinea and Ivory Coast. "While there have been failures,
the PSP-sceptics' reports are most often than not incomplete, incorrect, or
ignore the unforeseen changes that took place after the contract," it says.

War on Want, a UK-based campaigning group that backs anti-privatisation
lobbyists in South Africa, said the report showed that rich donor countries
were interfering in a domestic political dispute. USAid said its advice was
given at the request of the South African authorities. "We provide technical
analysis, not policy advice," said Rebecca Black, housing and municipal
affairs officer for USAid in Pretoria.

The Padco report was produced for the government-sponsored Municipal
Infrastructure Investment Unit (MIIU) in South Africa, which brings together
private and public sector experts to identify opportunities for partnership.
Last year, it concluded 13 partnerships worth about R3.4bn ($370m, ?367m,
£234m).  MIIU spokespersons claim the Unit did not use the report as it was
not what the unit expected.  But a copy of the report obtained by the FT
shows it was circulated at a meeting of UK government and private sector
water officials - including representatives from the Thames Water and Severn
Trent Water companies - seeking to identify municipalities in South Africa
for private investment.



Global Trade Round-Up

EU fisheries talks marked by sharp disagreement
(Dec 20, ICTSD, Weekly Trade Digest) EU fisheries ministers, scheduled to
complete talks on fishing quotas on Thursday, 19 December, struggled in
drawn-out meetings to find a compromise deal. While scientists warn that cod
and other key species are on the verge of becoming extinct and should be
protected, fishermen and nations with significant fishing fleets are
fighting to save jobs and safeguard coastal economies and communities. The
talks, which address both reform of the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CPF),
recovery plans for fish stocks and 2003 fishing quotas, have been described
as deadlocked. If the 15 EU fisheries ministers do not reach agreement on
Friday, 20 December -- an unscheduled extra day following the 16-19 December
Agriculture and Fisheries Council -- the European Commission may impose
emergency regulations for several months until the issue would be taken up
at the EU Council of Ministers meeting in March. Ministers have also
tentatively scheduled discussions for 8 February 2002. The European
Commission proposal under discussion does not involve the closure of North
Sea fisheries, but rather 80% cuts in quotas for cod, haddock and whiting,
and 40% cuts for plaice and sole. The proposal would also involve taking
more than 8,000 trawlers out of operation with EU aid while other vessels'
days at sea would be limited. In cases such as cod, this could mean just
seven days of permitted fishing every month. An estimated 28,000 jobs would
be lost under the plan. The Commission proposal also focuses on tightened
controls to tackle problems such as falsified reporting and operation in
prohibited areas. Spain, France and other countries with large fleets are
strongly opposed to the planned cutbacks. British and French fishermen have
held demonstrations and blockaded ports in protest.

The European Commission proposal is based on advice from the International
Council for the Exploration of the Sea, that recommended a full fishing ban
in order to preserve fish stocks for the future. The collapse of cod fishery
outside Newfoundland is salutory.  Ten years ago, cod reached extinction,
and despite a ten-year moratorium on fishing, the cod has not returned,
devastating fishing communities in the area.


LIMA
Worst Latin America employment crisis in 25 years - ILO (Dec 10 IPS) -
Employment in Latin America and the Caribbean is suffering the worst crisis
in the last quarter century due to the economic globalisation process,
says "Labour Outlook 2002", a new report by the regional office of the
International Labour Organisation (ILO).
The social situation is even worse than it was when the region was hit by
the Mexican financial  crisis of 1995, known as "the tequila effect", and by
the Asian financial crisis, which reached Latin America in 1998-1999, said
ILO director-general Juan Somavía.
Somavía presented the report to more than 400 representatives of governments
and business and labour organisations from 35 nations of the Americas
gathered in the Peruvian capital.

The ILO report compares urban unemployment rates in the first nine months of
this year with those of the same period in 2001 and found that it had
increased from 16.4 to 21.5 percent in Argentina, from 6.2 to 7.3 percent in
Brazil, 6.1 to 6.8 percent in Costa Rica, 2.4 to 2.8 percent in Mexico, 9..4
to 9.7 percent in Peru, 15.4 to 16.5 percent in Uruguay and from 13.9 to
15.5 percent in Venezuela.

The study also shows an increase in the informal labour market, with seven
out of 10 new jobs created in the region between 1990 and 2002 being in the
informal sector.

In reference to the rise of labour insecurity, the Geneva-based organisation
underscores that just six of 10 new jobs involve access to social security
services, and only two of 10 employed persons in the informal sector have
social benefits. The Latin American employment situation is characterised by
an expansion of social vulnerability and the continued denial of labour
rights to employees.


MEXICO CITY
First Indigenous Women summit rejects Free Trade Area
(Dec 5, IPS) Indian women activists from across the continent agreed in
Mexico to fight against the creation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA), while a United Nations official warned of an ''uncontrollable social
explosion'' if governments in the region fail to listen to indigenous
peoples' demands.

At the First Indigenous Women Summit of the Americas in the southern Mexican
city of Oaxaca, the chair of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations,
Miguel Martíne warned of possible ''unpleasant surprises'' in the future. An
''unpredictable and uncontrollable social explosion would be nothing more
than the product of an age-old sense of desperation'' on the part of
indigenous people in the Americas, he said.

Nearly all women in indigenous communities in Latin America are victims of
a centuries-old pattern of poverty and discrimination, the participants
pointed out.

The women agreed to boycott the FTAA, demanded respect for the right of
indigenous peoples to self-determination, and urged all people in the
Americas to join them in the fight against discrimination, racism and
violence.  They also called on the United Nations to approve the draft
declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples which has been in the
process of creation since the 1980s but has been blocked by the veto of
several governments.

The summit was organised by the foundation headed by Guatemalan indigenous
activist Rigoberta Menchú, who received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1992.

OTTAWA
Canadian Supreme Court  rejects patenting of genetically engineered life
form;
Ottawa, Dec5, Canadian Press - The Supreme Court of Canada has ruled that a
genetically engineered mouse developed by the Harvard University for use in
Cancer research cannot be patented under current Canadian Law.

Patents have been granted in Canada for genetically modified food crops, for
single-cell organisms like bacteria and yeast but this was a test case to
determine whether a patent could be awarded for an animal scientifically
defined as a higher life form.

Canadian church group
responds
(Toronto, Dec 5, CCODP) - The Canadian  Catholic Organisation for
Development and Peace has said that a ban on patenting of life forms will
stop firms from patenting varieties of seeds used in growing staple foods.
This will be positive, especially in the developing world, where some 1.4bn
farmers depend on free access to seeds of staple crops for their
livelihoods.  Welcoming the Supreme Court's decision to outrule a patent on
the Havard mouse, the organisation that Canada should defend the right of
developing coutries to resist pressure from the international agribusiness
lobby to allow patent on life forms.  The CCODP has therefore urged the
Canadian government to use its influence within the WTO to support
developing countries in their effort to resist pressure to allow patents on
seeds and other life forms.

QUITO
Joining FTAA is "suicide", says Foreign Minister
(January 2, 2003, BBC Worldwide Monitoring)
Ecuadorian Foreign Minister-designate Dr Nina Pacari has  described the Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) that the United States is promoting as
"suicide". "It would be suicide for Ecuador under current conditions; not
even the nation's business sector would have guarantees", she said in an
interview with Gamavision. The incoming foreign minister said it is
imperative to strengthen the Andean Community (CAN,) comprised of Bolivia,
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela as a  way to deal with the FTAA.

Many people believe that if the country joins the FTAA, local  industries
would be seriously affected and could close in the face of  foreign
competition, particularly in view of the production costs in an economy that
has been dolarized since 2000.  The country's social movements oppose FTAA,
and President-elect Lucio Gutierrez himself has said that it is a "threat"
to the economy of this Andean nation.


Notice Board

CIVIL SOCIETY PARALLEL TO UNEP's 22nd GOVERNING COUNCIL MEETING
The  22nd Governing Council/ Global Ministerial Environment Forum of the
United Nations Environment Programme, (UNEP) will be held in Nairobi, from
3-7  February  2003.  The  ministerial  segment will start on 5 to 7
February.  The  Governing  Council  will  discuss UNEP's strategy and
programme of work in the context of the WSSD Plan of Implementation.   A
session  will focus on Africa and NEPAD, on Wednesday, 5 February.  A Civil
Society Forum will be held back to back with the Governing Council, on 1 and
2 February. Saturday, 1 February, will be devoted  to  discussing  the
contribution  of  the  civil society, closely associated  with the work of
UNEP, to the development and implementation of the  Environment  Initiative
of  NEPAD,  as  a  way of strengthening civil society's engagement in NEPAD.
More information, contact David Ombisi, on David.Ombisi@unep.org for the
Office of Director, Regional Office for Africa, UNEP.

UNCTAD-ECA JOINT WORKSHOP ON AFRICAN MININING NETWORK
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) are jointly organizing
a workshop to discuss the establishment of an Africa Mining Network, to be
held at UNECA headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, during 25-27 February
2003.  The purpose of the workshop is to review the rationale for an Africa
Mining Network and to discuss modalities for the Network's establishment and
operation. The workshop and the Africa Mining Network are intended to
support ongoing and emerging initiatives in Africa including the Africa
Mining Partnership, a recent initiative of African mining ministers linked
to the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).  The Mining Network
is envisaged to bring together governments, the mining industry, and civil
society.  For information contact lauren.Murphy@unctad.org 

NEW PROGRAMME ON  CAPACITY BUILDING AND KNOWLEDGE NETWORKING ON GENDER,
MACROECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
A central component of the program is the two-week intensive course on
Engendering Macroeconomics and International Economics. The course will take
place in Salt Lake City, University of Utah in the United States from May
19-30, 2003. An  international conference on the themes of the program will
take place on June 2-4, 2003 at the University of Utah.   The program is
being organized by the International Working Group on Gender,
Macroeconomics, and International Economics, an international network of
economists which was formed in 1994.  The program is intended for
economists, including advanced graduate students in economics, as well as
more experienced academics, researchers and those in government.  A total of
thirty fellows will be admitted to the program.  Priority will be given to
applicants from the global South and transition economies.  Application
deadline for the course is January 20, 2003 Further information at
www.genderandmacro.org. For questions, contact:
genderandmacro@economics.utah.edu.

INTERNATIONAL MEETING: INQUIRY INTO WTO AGRICULTURE NEGOTIATIONS   An intern
ational meeting billed as an inquiry into the WTO Agriculture Agreement will
be held in Geneva, February 19-24, 2003. This is in response to the on-going
negotiations in the WTO aimed at to produce a 'modalities text' for a new
Agreement on Agriculture by March 2003, the first first consolidated draft
of which is to become available in advance of the planned Special Session of
the WTO Committee on Agriculture, February 24-28, to be finalized at the
March 25-31 Special Session.  The meeting will include among others,  three
day consultation by farmers and rganizations working on agriculture issues
in relation to the WTO; AoA orientation sessions; workshops on specific
developmental issues and lobbying with member delegations

The organizers of this event include: Church Development Service (EED),
(Berlin/Germany); Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy
(Minneapolis/U.S.A.); Ecumenical Advocacy Alliance of the World Council of
Churches (Geneva/International Network); World Council of Churches
(Geneva/International Organisation); Third World Network, Malaysia; CIDSE ;
Germanwatch; Canadian Foodgrains Bank

For further information and reaction contact: Rainer Engels, Germanwatch,
engels@germanwatch.org  Marta Cano, Germanwatch, macano@t-online.de 

Produced by the Political Economy Unit, Third World Network-Africa.
TWN-Africa is co-ordinator of the Africa Trade Network.  For more info, contact
TWN-Africa, Box 19452, Accra-North, GHANA.  Tel, 233 21 511189/503669
Email:  twnafrica@ghana.com  Website: www.twnafrica.org